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Are Microloans Bad for Growth? 
 
This paper constructs a two-period overlapping generations model of human capital 
investment decisions where a microloan program designed to finance entrepreneurial 
activities is active. It is shown that, in the presence of human capital externalities (social 
returns to education) there exists a range of microloan amounts that are growth depressing 
and welfare decreasing through their affect on the opportunity cost of schooling. By 
increasing the opportunity cost of schooling, microloans divert investment away from human 
capital: by failing to internalize the social returns to education, households’ individually 
optimal investment decisions in the face of microcredit availability act to depress the growth 
of the economy and result in sub-optimal welfare outcomes. 
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 1 Introduction
Micro￿nance and microloans have become one of the most celebrated devel-
opment success stories of the last quarter century. Micro￿nance institutions
have proliferated in the developing world and have become increasingly pop-
ular in developed countries. Praised for their ability to successfully provide
access to credit to a population that had previously been shut out of formal
credit markets, these organizations have traditionally described their activ-
ities as representing a successful poverty alleviation strategy. Empirical
evidence that such claims are true has been elusive with many studies fail-
ing to convincingly isolate a causal link and ￿nd evidence that the programs
positively in￿ uence various measures of welfare such as household consump-
tion. Studies of the e⁄ects of microloans also tend to focus on short-term
outcomes, neglecting the long-term implications of the programs.
Most existing studies of the e⁄ect of microloans on welfare focus on
measures of household consumption. There are a few studies, however,
that examine other household investments such as those in the education of
children. These studies focus on the short term educational consequences
of microloans, and have also found con￿ icting evidence about the e⁄ect of
microloans on educational investments. Two recent studies, however, have
found no or even negative e⁄ects of microloan receipt on investments in the
education of the children in the household.
It is, perhaps, hard to understand how microloans - especially those that
1inject outside capital into an essentially closed economy - could actually
be welfare reducing. In a static setting, the introduction of microloans
represents an expansion of the choice set, which should result in increased
utility. This perception has contributed to their status as perhaps the leading
anti-poverty agenda in low income countries.
However, in this paper we show that the nature of these loans, which
are typically small with quick commencement of repayment, can be quite
antithetical to long-term investment in human capital.1 If households have
binding time constraints then microloans can raise the current opportunity
cost of schooling, causing households to concentrate more on entrepreneurial
activities and less on education. This can have a bene￿cial short-term welfare
e⁄ect for households but a detrimental long-term e⁄ect for the household
dynasty. By raising the opportunity cost of schooling and demanding a quick
return on investment, microloans might actually serve to suppress human
capital accumulation in the communities in which they are introduced. In a
world in which there are social returns to education, the long-term e⁄ect of
microloans might actually be, therefore, to impede economic growth rather
than help it. This, in turn, can lead to decreased welfare. In the end, by
acting to suppress growth, microloan programs can result in increased rather
than decreased poverty.
This paper constructs a two-period overlapping generations model of
1See Morduch (1999) for a good overview of the economics of peer lending and charac-
teristics of typical micro￿nance programs.
2household investment decisions where a microloan program designed to ￿-
nance entrepreneurial activities exists. The model shows that the e⁄ect on
educational outcomes of recipient households will depend on both the impact
of easing the resource constraint on educational investment and the raising
of the opportunity cost of education. These two forces are in tension and the
resolution of this tension has major implications for growth. The paper then
describes conditions in which microloans can lead to lower growth and lower
welfare through their depressing e⁄ect on human capital investments.
In the end, it is shown that despite the fact that microloans introduce
new resources into an economy, they can be detrimental to economic growth.
The paper goes on to discuss some particular aspects of microloans that could
contribute to the adverse consequences of the loan program, in particular the
size and repayment schedule of the loans.
2 Related Literature
Micro￿nance as a development tool and policy has spread rapidly through-
out the world. The Microcredit Summit Campaign estimates that in 2007,
microcredit had reached almost 155 million recipients, almost 110 million of
whom were women and over 106 million were considered to be among the
world￿ s poorest (Daley-Harris, 2009). Despite the popularity and spread of
microcredit, relatively little is known about the e⁄ect of credit receipt on the
outcomes of individuals and households. Because of this lacuna, there are
3many recent and ongoing studies of the e⁄ects of the distribution of micro-
credit to the poor.
The early economic literature on micro￿nance focused on group liability
as a way to overcome the lack of information and collateral in low-income
country credit markets (Stiglitz 1990, Ghatak and Guinnane 1999, Armen-
dariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005). Group lending was shown to have
the potential to overcome these information and collateral problems. With
shared liability, the entire group becomes responsible for repayment and thus
group members have an incentive monitor each other. And indeed the ev-
idence suggests that group lending and peer-monitoring have been very ef-
fective: repayment rates for microloans average over 90 percent (Grameen
Foundation).
Empirical studies of the e⁄ects of microloans on the outcomes of the
participants are numerous and often con￿ icting. Pitt and Khandker (1998)
￿nd large positive consumption e⁄ects from Grameen Bank loans, especially
for women. Coleman (1999), however, ￿nds little to no impact of a micro-
credit program in Northeast Thailand on recipient welfare, but notes that
failure to control for selection would lead to a conclusion of positive impacts.
Kaboski and Townsend (2005) using a natural experiment approach ￿nd pos-
itive consumption impacts of microloans, but not on investment. Karlan and
Zinman (2009) use randomization of marginal clients to evaluate the impact
of consumer lending in South Africa, and ￿nd that the receipt of microcre-
dit improves the welfare of the recipients. In a novel approach to address
4the selection problem, Schroeder (2010) examines consumption e⁄ects from
Grameen Bank lending in Bangladesh using an estimation strategy that relies
on second-moment restrictions and ￿nds positive and signi￿cant consumption
e⁄ects from microloans.
To address the problem of selection, randomized designs have been used
to explore the impact of micro￿nance product design such as group lend-
ing and repayment schedules (e.g. GinØ and Karlan (2006, 2009), Field and
Pande (2008)). Banerjee, et. al. (2009) is the only large-scale randomized
experiment that examines outcomes from a microcredit intervention In this
study, the authors ￿nd that durable consumption rises but non-durable con-
sumption does not. More importantly for the current analysis, they do not
￿nd any measurable e⁄ects on health or educational investment.
Studies of the speci￿c e⁄ects of microloans on educational investment and
educational outcomes are few. The aforementioned Banerjee, et. al. (2009)
study included a measure of educational investment and found no measurable
e⁄ect. However, a study of the e⁄ect of microloan receipt in Bangladesh
by Islam and Choe (2009) found that microloans reduced school enrollment
among children of recipient households. Maldonadoa and GonzÆlez-Vega
(2008) ￿nd evidence from Bolivia that microloans increase the labor demands
of children and thus potentially lower educational investment. However, In
a study of two districts in Buenos Aires, Becchetti and Conzo (2010) ￿nd
positive e⁄ects of microloans on schooling.
The theoretical analysis relies critically on the presence of human capi-
5tal externalities. Such agglomeration externalities are empirically very well
founded. Unlike the relative paucity of studies of microloans and education,
many studies have found signi￿cant social returns to education (see, e.g.
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002 for a good meta-analysis of the empirical
literature on social returns to education).
The theoretical literature on micro￿nance has largely been con￿ned to
the aforemantioned studies of the e¢ cacy of microcredit and peer lending in
overcoming information and collateral constraints (e.g., Besley and Coate,
1995; Varian, 1989) and less focused on recipient households or how their
choices a⁄ect an economy as in the present study. Perhaps the most closely
related paper to the current study is Wydick (1999) who constructs a static
model of household investment decisions and illustrates how access to micro-
credit for capital investments can increase the value of the marginal product
of the labor of children in the household which raises the opportunity cost
of education and thus depresses the level of educational investment. An em-
pirical analysis using Guatemalan data reveals that when families use micro-
credit to ￿nance capital investments the likelihood a child in the household
will be withdrawn from school to work increases. The aforementioned paper
by Maldonadoa and GonzÆlez-Vega (2008) also constructs a static model of
household investment. The current study expands on these static models
to examine the long-run consequences of microcredit on the growth of an
economy and the welfare of its inhabitants.
63 Model and results
The introduction of micro-loans into a developing economy provides liquidity
access to productive agents who, because of ￿nancial market incompleteness,
would otherwise be denied funding for their projects; and it is natural to think
that this increase in market e¢ ciency improves welfare. However, access to
funds also raises the opportunity cost of education and thus may lower the
aggregate level of human capital. Absent external bene￿ts to education,
the increase in ￿nancial market e¢ ciency is necessarily welfare enhancing,
and this result holds even with the potential reduction in aggregate human
capital. On the other hand, if the economy exhibits agglomeration e⁄ects
then the welfare implications of micro-loan availability are less clear.
To assess whether and when micro-loans may reduce aggregate human
capital and welfare, we develop a simple overlapping generations model of
competing interests. Young agents must choose e⁄ort levels directed toward
education or entrepreneurial production as made available via micro-loans.
Old agents have access to micro-loans, but may also produce via a technol-
ogy dependent on both individual and aggregate human capital. By stripping
the model of features incidental to the trade-o⁄ between human capital ac-
cumulation and goods production, we are then able to obtain sharp results
characterizing the potential for welfare reduction.
We consider a two-period model with agglomeration e⁄ects and no pop-
ulation growth. For simplicity, both young and old own their production
7technology and consume what they produce. This yeoman farmer assump-
tion is a technical device which helps expose the salient features of the model;
however, we could equally develop the arguments by assuming competitive
goods and labor markets, and inelastic labor supply.
3.1 Equilibrium in the general model
We begin with a fairly general speci￿cation; this helps us identify tangential
aspects of the model that may be simpli￿ed to provide sharpness while im-
parting little cost to robustness. A young agent has unit time endowment
which he may divide between goods production and human capital accumu-
lation. Goods are produced via a primitive technology f which takes only
labor as a input; but, we also assume that micro-loans enhance labor produc-
tivity. Letting c1t be goods consumption of the representative young agent
in time t, we write
c1t = f(Mt;n1t) ￿ (1 + it)Mt (1)
ht = g(1 ￿ n1t): (2)
Here n is the labor supplied by the agent towards good production, i is the
interest rate on the loan M (for simplicity, we assume repayment is made
contemporaneously), h is the attained level of human capital accumulation,
8and g captures the production of human capital accumulation.2
An old agent also has a unit of time which he supplies inelastically to
goods production. He has access to the same technology as when young, but
also to an additional technology, F. Letting c2t be goods consumption of the
representative agent who is old in period t, we write
(3) c2t+1 = F(ht;Ht+1;1 ￿ n2t+1) + f(Mt+1;n2t+1) ￿ (1 + it+1)Mt+1:
Here F captures the education enhanced production technology available to
the old. Notice that this technology depends on both the individual human
capital acquired when young, ht, and the time t+1 level of aggregate human
capital Ht+1.
Young agents in time t receive utility, u, from consumption in periods t
and t + 1, as well as from the well-being of their progeny; they make time
t decisions to maximize expected utility subject to the constraints indicated
above and conditional on available information. Let It be the collection of
all variables dated t ￿ n for n ￿ 0. Let Vt(It￿1) be the value function for
the representative young agent time t. Then Vt(It) is obtained by choosing
c1t;nt;ht;ct+1 to maximize
(4) u(c1t;c2t+1;Vt+1 (It+1))
2Implicit in our production formulation is that the young agent supply labor inelasti-
cally: no value is place on leisure.
9subject to the constraints (1) ￿(3).
Because there is no uncertainty in the economy ￿no stochastic component
to the model ￿we focus on perfect foresight behavior and exclude an expec-
tations operator in the young agent￿ s problem. Equilibrium in the model
is obtained by exploiting the assumption that all agents are identical, and
identifying individual and aggregate human capital: Ht+1 = ht. Thus an
equilibrium is any collection of sequences fc1t;c2t;ht;n1t;n2t;Htg satisfying
Ht+1 = ht, constraints (1) ￿(3), and the representative agent￿ s ￿rst order
conditions.
3.2 Equilibrium in the stylized model
The level of generality sustained in the previous subsection is useful for de￿n-
ing the modeling environment and understanding the broadest set of natural
assumptions; however, to make progress and provide sharp conclusions, fur-
ther assumptions are required. We retain the potential for agglomeration
e⁄ects, thereby placing a wedge between individual and social opportunity
costs, and we abstract from other production non-linearities. The utility
speci￿cation is modi￿ed to eliminate dependence on progeny, and to impose
inter-temporal additivity and that instantaneous felicity exhibits constant
relative risk aversion; and we abstract from the need for loan repayment.3
Finally, the education enhanced production technology F is taken to be ￿all
3Alternatively, we may assume that the primitive technology is written in ￿net of
repayment￿terms.
10or nothing￿in labor: using F is a full-time job. This modeling feature is
incorporated using an indicator function ￿(n) which is equal to unity when
n = 1 and zero otherwise, together with the assumption that F(h;H;0) = 0.












ht = 1 ￿ n1t
c2t+1 = F(ht;Ht+1;￿(1 ￿ n2t+1)) + mt+1(Mt+1)n2t+1 (5)
Here mt(Mt) is the productivity of primitive labor as dependent on the level
of micro-loans. In the sequel, we simply take mt be the the time t level of
micro-loans.
Corner solutions are possible in this model, but given the utility spec-
i￿cation, they may be disregarded by appropriate choice of the production
function F; therefore, we focus on interior behavior. Note, in particular, that
for appropriately scaled F, older agents will never choose to acquire micro
loans; thus abusing notation slightly, we may simplify (5) to be
c2t+1 = F(ht;Ht+1):
The lack of lags in the production technologies allows us to abstract from
time-dependent equilibrium when writing the ￿rst order conditions and equi-










Imposing the equilibrium restriction that h = H yields the following equation
identifying equilibrium in the stylized model:
(7) F(H;H)
￿m
1￿￿ = Fh(H;H)(1 ￿ H)
￿:
Denote by Hss a solution to this model. Then equation (7) may be analyzed
to assess the impact on Hss of exogenous changes in m.
3.3 Comparative Statics
Our intuition is that the availability of micro-loans raises the opportunity cost
of education and subsequently decreases equilibrium aggregate human capi-
tal. Whether this decrease obtains depends delicately on income/substitution
e⁄ects, as captured by the elasticity ￿, as well as the agglomeration impact of
H on individual human capital productivity. To assess these dependencies,
@Hss=@m may be computed explicitly. The resulting expression is compli-
cated and of little intuitive value, but concise results are available.
Proposition 1 If ￿ < 1 then there exists ￿ > 0 so that Fhh + FhH < ￿
implies @Hss=@m < 0:
12The proof of this proposition, as well as an explicit formula for @Hss=@m,
is provided in the Appendix.
To interpret this proposition, note that the value of m in part measures
the price of consumption today in terms of consumption tomorrow: if m
increases then the price goes down. When ￿ < 1, the substitution e⁄ect
dominates the income e⁄ect so that agents have a tendency to choose con-
sumption today at the expense of education today and consumption tomor-
row. However, the price of c1 in terms of c2 is also a⁄ected by Fh, which is
why the second condition, Fhh +FhH < ￿, plays a role. As Fh increases, the
price of c1 in terms of c2 rises, thus providing agents an incentive to attain
more education today, in favor of consumption tomorrow. The condition
Fhh +FhH < ￿ restricts the increase in Fh given an increase in H so that, in
equilibrium, the in￿ uence of Fh on relative price is smaller than the in￿ uence
of m.4
Proposition 1 con￿rms our intuition, and provides the main result of
the paper: by raising the opportunity cost of education, micro-loans may
reduce the aggregate level of human capital. Human capital accumulation
is widely held as an important determinant of long run economic growth
and a key to escaping poverty traps; through this lens, we may broadly
interpret Proposition 1 as indicating that, and providing conditions under
which, micro-loans may be welfare reducing. The simple structure of our
4In general, Fhh < 0 and FhH > 0, so the condition could be similarly stated that FhH
not be too large. The precise condition bounding FhH is given in the Appendix, and may
not be at all restrictive.
13model allows us to strengthen this point via direct computation. Denote by
css


















where we interpret W as welfare and Y as output (gdp). We have the fol-
lowing result:
Proposition 2 Suppose ￿ < 1.
















Fh+FH￿m if Fh + FH ￿ m > 0
(1￿H)
Fh+FH￿m if Fh + FH ￿ m < 0
The proof of this proposition is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 provides precise conditions under which increasing access
to micro-loans not only reduces aggregate human capital, but explicitly re-
duces welfare and economic output as well. The potential for welfare or gdp
reduction given an increase in m is somewhat surprising as, given our model-
14ing technique, increasing m directly increases the productivity of the young
while having no exogenous impact on the productivity of the old. These
results turn on the presence of the agglomeration e⁄ect, as can be seen in
condition (8): if FH = 0, this condition can not be satis￿ed. Of course, that
the possibility of welfare reduction requires FH > 0 is not surprising: without
agglomeration e⁄ects, an increase in m simply enlarges the choice set of an
individual, and thus can not be welfare reducing.
3.4 An example
The results in Propositions 1 and 2, which characterize some of the equilib-
rium comparative statics in our model, are contingent upon the assumption
of equilibrium existence. This contingency could be eliminated by imposing
restrictions on the production function F guaranteeing that (7) has a solution
in the interval (0;1). Instead, we explore the potential for a well-understood
functional form to yield the desired results. Let F(h;H) = Ah￿H￿: here A
is a scaling parameter, which may be interpreted as total factor productivity,
and ￿ and ￿ are the elasticities of individual and aggregate human capital,
respectively. With this speci￿cation for F, it can be shown that when ￿ > 1,
the equilibrium condition (7) always has a unique solution, and when ￿ < 1
then uniqueness is guaranteed by the condition ￿ + ￿ < 1
1￿￿, which is an
assumption we maintain.









Figure 1: Equilibrium e⁄ects
16all ￿gures below, we have chosen the parameter values A = 3 and ￿ = ￿ = :5,
and we allow m to vary between zero and 1:5; and in Figure 1, risk aversion
is set to ￿ = :4. The solid curve plots the steady-state values of aggregate
human capital for varying micro-loan levels. Notice that, consistent with
Proposition 1 (and that ￿ < 1), the curve is downward-sloping, indicating
that increased m leads to decreased aggregate investment in human capital.
Now consider the coarsely dashed curved, labeled ￿Welfare.￿For each m,







thus, by Proposition 2, when the curve is below the horizontal axis, @W=@m <
0. For the given speci￿cation of the model, if m <￿ :6, then, even though
increasing m raises the productivity capacity of the young, it lowers aggre-
gate human capital enough to reduce welfare. A analogous, and even more
robust deleterious impact on output is revealed via the ￿nely dashed curve
labeled ￿GDP￿in Figure 1. This curve plots the sum
(1 ￿ H)




and we checked that Fh + FH ￿ m > 0; thus, by Proposition 2, when this
curve is below the horizontal axis, @Y=@m < 0. We ￿nd that for m <￿ :1:2,
the fall in H associated to a rise in m reduces economic output.
17increasing









18Because of the importance of the income/substitution e⁄ect, we also
present numerical analysis focusing on variation in ￿. Figure 2 plots the
steady-state values of aggregate human capital. Here, ￿ increases from :1 to
:8. The arrow in the ￿gure indicates the way in which the plots of Hss(m)
change as ￿ increases. Note that for all plots, Hss is (at least weakly) de-
creasing in m.5 For small ￿ and small m, consumption in period one is very
low as agents substitute heavily toward education and consumption in period
2. As m increases, the relative price of consumption today falls and agents
shift e⁄ort toward current period production.
The curves analogous to the Welfare curve in Figure 1 are plotted in
Figure 3 for ￿ 2 f:2;:4;:6;:8g. For small ￿ micro-loans are always welfare
reducing; for ￿ = :4, larger loans increase welfare; and for ￿ = :6 and :8,
increasing m increases welfare: when the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution is high (small ￿) and m rises thereby reducing the relative price of
c1, agents shift consumption to the ￿rst period and reduce investment in hu-
man capital, which, through the agglomeration channel, reduces production
enough in the second period to reduce welfare; when ￿ is larger, the sub-
stitution toward ￿rst period consumption is mitigated thereby reducing the
deleterious e⁄ect of decreased human capital on period two production.
The same intuition holds for Figure 4, which plots the GDP curves cor-
5For small ￿ and low values of m, Figure ?? appears to indicate that Hss = 1 and is
























21responding to ￿ 2 f:2;:4;:6;:8g. Notice that even for large ￿, small values of
m correspond to @Y=@m < 0.
4 Conclusion and Discussion
Access to credit is scarce for poor families in developing countries. Microcre-
dit institutions that provide credit to these households through peer-lending
and other ￿nancial innovations provide liquidity that can have many positive
attributes: investment in productive assets, insurance against income shocks
and so on. But the nature of the typical microloan - that it is small and
repayment begins very soon after the loan is acquired - may create incentives
to make investments in very short-term productive assets at the expense of
assets that pay o⁄in the future. One such asset is human capital. Thus, mi-
croloans may actually increase the opportunity cost of education and reduce
educational investment by recipient households. Such choices are individu-
ally rational. Education, however, has substantial social returns as well as
private returns. Thus the decision by households that receive microloans to
reduce investments in human capital ends up lowering societal productivity.
The sensitivity of the results in the paper to the assumed income and
substitution e⁄ects may help expalin why previous empirical research has
not reached consensus. It is quite likely that the same loan program applies
in di⁄erent contexts may have very di⁄erent results in terms of education and
other human capital investments. Blanket policy recommendations are thus
22inappropriate, but our model suggests two aspects of microloans that may
contribute to constrained investment in education: the quick commencment
of repayment and the size of the loan.
In the model presented in this paper, the return on investments is net of
repayment, so in essence we are forcing immediate (within period) repayment.
Relaxing this constraint would allow investments in assets that may have
a higher present discounted values, but whose returns do not come until
the next period. Student loans in the United States have the feature that
repayment begins only when the investment begins to realize returns; when
the recipient begins to work post-education. Such a loan program might be
very bene￿cial to developing country economies as well.
It is also shown in the theory that larger loans can overcome the negative
human capital aspects of microloans. It should be noted that this is despite
the fact that microloans always depress human capital accumulation. Larger
loans inject enough new capital into the economy that they overcome the
damage done to the economy by the suppression of educational investments.
Such new wealth might ease credit constraints of future generations, however,
so the long term a⁄ect on growth and welfare might be positive. This is
worth exporing in a fully dynamic model of microcredit on a similar stylized
economy.
235 Appendix










(￿ ￿ 1)m￿￿F ￿
￿m1￿￿F ￿￿1 (Fh + FH) + ￿Fh (1 ￿ Hss)
￿￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ Hss)
￿ (Fhh + FhH)
;
where F and all of its partials are evaluated at (Hss;Hss): The proof of
Proposition 1 follows from the observation that @Hss
@m < 0 provided that
Fhh + FhH < ￿ ￿






























dc1 = (1 ￿ H
ss)dm ￿ mdH
ss (11)
dc2 = (Fh + FH)dH
ss: (12)
Equations (10) ￿(12) combine to obtain the conditions in Proposition 2.
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